Do National Fiscal Rules Support Numerical Compliance with EU Fiscal Rules? by Cristiana Belu Manescu, Elva Bova, Martijn Hoogeland and Philipp Mohl published by European Commission (2023).
This paper investigates how national fiscal rules have supported numerical compliance with EU fiscal rules. Using a novel dataset of numerical compliance with national fiscal rules, the relationship between national and EU rule compliances is explored using both descriptive analysis and panel regression analysis applied for fiscal rules in place between 1998 and 2019. The descriptive analysis shows that compliance with national and EU rules is on average higher in low-debt situations, with compliance with EU fiscal rules somehow higher than for national rules. Panel regressions show that the simple presence of a national fiscal rule does not seem to matter for EU rule compliance. However, national rules that are complied with and are well designed are associated with compliance with almost all types of EU fiscal rules. Against the usual caveats on panel regressions, the results suggest that rule design, monitoring and enforcement can enhance ownership and therefore compliance with numerical fiscal rules.