The Central Bank Transparency Code published by IMF (7/2020).
“The paper reports to the Executive Board on its decision of April 29, 2019, to prepare an IMF Central Bank Transparency Code (CBT), which is linked to the 2017 Review of the Standards and Codes Initiative (RSCI), for a revision and update of the 1999 Monetary and Financial Policies Transparency Code (MFPT). Directors asked that the CBT should remove the overlap on financial policies covered by other international standards, expand the transparency standards to broader set of activities undertaken by many central banks since the 2008 financial crisis, and reorient the transparency standards to facilitate risk-based assessments to support policy effectiveness and address macroeconomic risks.
The paper reports to the Executive Board on its decision of April 29, 2019, to prepare an IMF Central Bank Transparency Code (CBT), which is linked to the 2017 Review of the Standards and Codes Initiative (RSCI), for a revision and update of the 1999 Monetary and Financial Policies Transparency Code (MFPT). Directors asked that the CBT should remove the overlap on financial policies covered by other international standards, expand the transparency standards to broader set of activities undertaken by many central banks since the 2008 financial crisis, and reorient the transparency standards to facilitate risk-based assessments to support policy effectiveness and address macroeconomic risks.
This paper presents a staff proposal for the CBT. The proposal builds on the Board-approved CBT 5-pillar framework and consists of (i) central bank transparency principles; (ii) central bank transparency practices; (iii) a glossary; and (iv) an annex with relevant transparency related principles from financial policy standards.
The modular approach of the CBT allows for a voluntary and proportional application that takes into account country-specific circumstances. The CBT could also be used by central banks to map their transparency frameworks and make informed choices on their transparency arrangements. The CBT is not intended to serve as a central bank governance framework.
Extensive stakeholder consultation provided important input. This includes feedback from a High-Level Advisory Panel consisting of eminent former central bank governors and academics, central banks and monetary unions, and international organizations and standard setters. Notably, their suggestions on issues related to the appropriate balance between transparency and confidentiality helped improve the CBT’s flexibility to take account of the diversity of transparency practices across jurisdictions reflecting different legal and structural backgrounds.
The CBT will support Fund capacity building activities Technical Assistance (TA) and Financial Sector Stability Reviews (FSSR); Surveillance—Article IV Consultations and Financial Sector Stability Programs (FSAP)]; Use of Fund Resources (UFR); and in the Fund’s Good Governance Framework for enhanced Fund engagement on governance.
Staff is seeking Board endorsement of the proposed CBT…”
Verificar PDF Anexado
