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Atualização 60, 20/06/2020
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Medidas Emergenciais de Proteção às Empresas apresentação realizada por José R. Afonso em TCU Seminário (6/2020).
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"Objetivos
Conter o colapso das expectativas sobre o nível de demanda e produção.
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Manter relações comerciais dentro das cadeias produtivas.
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Garantir que a inadimplência no pagamento de impostos não destrua as finanças de Estados/Municípios, que são os executores das políticas de saúde e segurança.
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Dar sustentação aos serviços básicos (água, energia, comunicações e combustíveis) que costumam ter níveis de inadimplência alta em crises agudas.
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Seccionar a expansão da dívida pública que se dará em decorrência do combate ao Covid19.
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Garantir que o Fundo de Recuperação Emergencial ajude a administrar a percepção de risco de crédito das empresas e seus efeitos sobre os balanços bancários.
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Crédito via “maquininhas” às empresas de menor porte
• Empresas optantes pelo SIMPLES receberão os recursos mensais obrigatoriamente via Instituições de pagamento (empresas de adquirência).
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• Recursos serão consolidados na emissão de NCRE, em nome da empresa contratante, pelo respectivo Fundo de Recuperação Econômica(FRE).
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• Limite de crédito equivalente a 2 vezes valor efetivamente recolhido em todo o ano de 2019, na forma de tributos e contribuições sociais.
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• Os recursos também estarão vinculados aos mesmos pagamentos exigidos para emissão de NCRE..."
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Public Debt and Low Interest Rates by Olivier Blanchard published by PIIE (2/2020).
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"Blanchard develops four main arguments concerning the costs of public debt when safe interest rates are low.
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First, the current US situation in which safe interest rates are expected to remain below growth rates for a long time is more the historical norm than the exception. If the future is like the past, this implies that debt rollovers—that is, the issuance of debt without a subsequent increase in taxes—may well be feasible. Put bluntly, public debt may have no fiscal cost.
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Second, even without fiscal costs, public debt reduces capital accumulation and may therefore have welfare costs. However, welfare costs may be smaller than typically assumed. The reason is that the safe rate is the risk-adjusted rate of return on capital. A safe rate that is lower than the growth rate indicates that the risk-adjusted rate of return to capital is in fact low. The average risky rate, i.e. the average marginal product of capital, also plays a role, however. Blanchard shows how both the average risky rate and the average safe rate determine welfare outcomes.
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Third, while the measured rate of earnings has been and is still quite high, the evidence from asset markets suggests that the marginal product of capital may be lower, with the difference reflecting either mismeasurement of capital or rents. This matters for debt: The lower the marginal product, the lower the welfare cost of debt.
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Fourth, Blanchard discusses a number of arguments against high public debt, and in particular the existence of multiple equilibria where investors, believing debt to be risky, require a risk premium, which increases the fiscal burden and makes debt effectively more risky. This argument, while relevant, does not have straightforward implications for the appropriate level of debt. Some of these conclusions will be controversial. But the aim of the paper is to foster a richer discussion of the costs of debt and fiscal policy than is currently the case, not to argue for more public debt, especially in the current political environment."
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Central banks’ response to Covid-19 in advanced economies by Paolo Cavallino and Fiorella De Fiore published by BIS (6/2020).
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"The outbreak of Covid-19 was a shock of unprecedented size and nature. Lockdowns and containment measures on a global scale led to a generalised sudden stop in economic activity. Workers’ reduced income – particularly for precarious workers – exacerbated the fall in demand induced by distancing measures and contributed to an increase in the risk of delinquency on mortgages and consumer loans. Businesses suffered from collapsing productive activities and reduced cash flow, which was particularly acute in sectors such as automotive, retail and travel. Concerns about household and corporate liquidity, combined with heightened uncertainty, hampered the functioning of key financial market segments.
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In March 2020, corporate spreads surged globally for high-yield as well as investment grade issuers. The markets for asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities froze in many countries. Commercial paper markets experienced strain in the United States, Canada and the euro area due to enhanced rollover risk. Equity markets came under stress, and implied volatilities jumped for a wide range of assets. The global dash-for-cash disrupted fixed income asset markets. The US Treasury market experienced a sharp sell-off leading to spikes in long-term yields (Schrimpf, Shin and Sushko (2020)). Pressures arose in the Japanese government bond (JGB) market, and sovereign spreads widened substantially in the euro area.
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Central banks responded promptly and forcefully, consistent with their mandates, to preserve smooth market functioning and an effective transmission of monetary policy. This Bulletin reviews the response of the central banks of the United States, the euro area, Japan, the United Kingdom and Canada.
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A swift and forceful reaction
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The overriding goal of central banks was to cushion the inevitable drop in economic activity by ensuring a smooth functioning of the financial system and facilitating the flow of credit to households and firms. In doing so, central banks performed their traditional crisis role as lenders of last resort to the financial sector. They extended it further to become providers of liquidity to the private non-financial sector.
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Between March and April 2020, the five central banks under review deployed the full set of crisis management policies at their disposal (Table 1). They all offered new lending operations, and either extended or inaugurated asset purchase programmes. The Federal Reserve, the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England also cut interest rates. In addition, the Federal Reserve and, on a lesser scale, the ECB and the Bank of Japan increased the availability of their currencies abroad through swap lines..."
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The global pandemic, sustainable economic recovery, and international taxation published by ICRICT (2020).
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"The global pandemic has led to major structural increases in public expenditure to support health, incomes and employment. But the economic burden must not fall disproportionately on disadvantaged groups and countries.
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Reductions in corporation tax ‘to stimulate reconstruction investment’ will be neither economically effective nor socially desirable. Rather, corporate tax systems should be strengthened by accelerating truly inclusive international cooperation on base erosion and minimum rates, and by making the system more progressive, which will require increased transparency of multinationals and offshore wealth.
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In consequence, responsible governments should:
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THE GLOBAL PANDEMIC, SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC RECOVERY, AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
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i. apply a higher corporate tax rate to large corporations in oligopolised sectors with excess rates of return;
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ii. set a minimum effective corporate tax rate of 25% worldwide to stop base erosion and profit shifting;
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iii. introduce progressive digital services taxes on the economic rents captured by multinational firms in this sector;
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iv. require publication of country by country reporting for all corporations benefitting from state support;
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v. publish data on offshore wealth to enable all jurisdictions to adopt effective progressive wealth taxes on their residents and to be able to better monitor effective income tax rates on highest income taxpayers..."
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Nova transação excepcional da Dívida Ativa - Portaria PGFN nº14.402/2020 da Procuradoria Geral da Fazenda Nacional.
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"Em 17 de junho de 2020, foi publicada a Portaria nº 14.402 para disciplinar os procedimentos, os requisitos e as condições necessárias à realização da transação excepcional na cobrança da Dívida Ativa da União (DAU), cuja inscrição e administração incumbam à Procuradoria-Geral da Fazenda Nacional (PGFN), em razão dos efeitos da pandemia causada pelo COVID-19 na perspectiva de recebimento de créditos inscritos."
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The Rich Cut Their Spending. That Has Hurt All the Workers Who Count on It by Emily Badger and Alicia Parlapiano published by NYTimes (6/2020).
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"The steepest declines in spending during the coronavirus recession have come from the highest-income places.
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In the Manhattan restaurants around Lincoln Center, the tips often rose and fell with the changing playbill. A popular classic musical could mean more preshow diners, and more income. A more famous actress as Eliza Doolittle could do the same. The end of a big run, like “My Fair Lady,” meant the opposite: Tips would be down for a while.
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“We were dependent on how well shows were doing at Lincoln Center, and we really did pay attention,” said Emma Craig, who was a server at the Atlantic Grill a block away before the coronavirus crisis. She has not returned to that job yet, or to another singing at a private supper club downtown. In both jobs, she said, “I am dependent on the trickle down.”
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The recession has crushed this kind of work in particular: service jobs that depend directly on the spending — and the whims — of the well-off.
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Economists at the Harvard-based research group Opportunity Insights estimate that the highest-earning quarter of Americans has been responsible for about half of the decline in consumption during this recession. And that has wreaked havoc on the lower-wage service workers on the other end of many of their transactions, the researchers say.
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“One of the things this crisis has made salient is how interdependent our health was,” said Michael Stepner, an economist at the University of Toronto. “We’re seeing the mirror of that on the economic side.”
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As income inequality has grown in America, so has inequality in consumption. That means that when the rich spend money, they drive more of the economy than they did 50 years ago. And more workers depend on them.
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Put another way, this particular economic shock — one that has halted much in-person spending, even by rich people who never lost their jobs — has been devastating for an economy in which many low-wage workers count on high-income people spending money.
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Mr. Stepner and the economists Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren and John Friedman have collected data from credit card processors, payroll firms and other private companies tracking how and where people spend their money, and how businesses and their workers have been affected as a result. By tying debit and credit card spending back to the home ZIP codes of millions of anonymized cardholders, they estimate that households in the bottom quarter of ZIP codes by income cut their spending by about 30 percent from pre-coronavirus levels at the lowest point in late March. Now, with the help of government stimulus, low-income spending is down only about 5 percent..."
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Protecting People and Economies : Integrated Policy Responses to COVID-19 published by World Bank (5/2020)
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"The COVID-19 pandemic has unleashed a global health emergency and an unprecedented economic crisis of historic magnitude. Governments facing this threat are in uncharted territory, but three policy priorities addressed in this note are clear. Disease containment is a first-order concern to combat the pandemic, and measures such as testing and tracing, coupled with isolating and treating the infected can bring first-order gains. The economic crisis requires a parallel and simultaneous effort to save jobs, protect income, and ensure access to services for vulnerable populations. As governments act to slow the pandemic and protect lives and livelihoods now, they will need to maintain macro stability, continue to build trust, and communicate clearly to avoid deeper downturns and social unrest. Looking forward, this crisis can be an opportunity to rethink policy to build back with stronger systems for people and economies."
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“Os empregos não desaparecerão, mas sim eles serão reinventados” entrevista com Gabriel Pinto, autor do livro “Passaporte para o Futuro”, especialista do tema Futuro do Trabalho publicado por Medium Corporation (6/2020).
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"Aproveitamos a publicação do livro “Passaporte para o Futuro” para abordar algumas das maiores dúvidas atuais sobre a evolução acelerada do mercado do trabalho ligada à transformação tecnológica do mundo. O Gabriel Pinto palestrará na quarta edição do .Futuro I Rio, conferência B2B sobre tecnologia.
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Quais são as expectativas e qual será a realidade com relação à automação do trabalho ?
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As novas tecnologias vinham ocupando pouco a pouco o mercado brasileiro, em uma velocidade menor do que o observado no resto do mundo. Muitas lideranças não dedicavam tanta atenção no investimento e na aplicação da inteligência artificial, da utilização do Big Data ou da Internet das Coisas, tecnologias que estão no topo das prioridades das empresas globais. No caso brasileiro, muitas empresas foram surpreendidas com nenhuma ou pouca presença digital. Acontece que a crise da pandemia acelerou o processo de digitalização global e podemos esperar o aumento da automação de muitas atividades que ainda hoje são executadas por profissionais e os efeitos serão nocivos. Ressalto que 60% dos profissionais tem um risco elevado de ser substituído por algum tipo de automação..."
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Global Value Chains and the Removal of Trade Protection by Chad P. Bown, Aksel Erbahar, and Maurizio Zanardi published by PIIE (2/2020).
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"This paper examines how trade protection is affected by changes in the valueadded content of production arising through global value chains (GVCs). Exploiting a new set of World Trade Organization (WTO) rules adopted in 1995 that impose an exogenously timed requirement for countries to reevaluate their previously imposed trade protection, we adopt an instrumental variables strategy and identify the causal effect of GVC integration on the likelihood that a trade barrier is removed. Using a newly constructed dataset of protection removal decisions involving 10 countries, 41 trading partners, and 18 industries over 1995–2013, we find that bilateral industry-specific domestic value-added growth in foreign production significantly raises the probability of removing a duty. The results are not limited to imports from China but are only found for the protection decisions of high-income countries. Back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that rapid GVC growth in the 2000s freed almost a third of the trade flows subject to the most common temporary restrictions (i.e., antidumping) applied by highincome countries in 2006."
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